Can we resolve the problem of free will by understanding the cognitive adaptations involved and what they are for?
Pietraszewski, D. & Hills, T. (under review). A psychological explanation of the problem of free will. OSF Preprint
Does the way our minds evolved to think about the mind prevent us from making progress in psychology? What recurring mistakes can we avoid if we understand how our intuitive psychology is biased towards understanding the mind?
Pietraszewski, D. (under review). What a difference a mind makes: The origin and structure of human intuitive psychology, and its implications for psychological science. OSF Preprint
What functions would you need to put into a mechanical thing to get it to reason about and represent groups? What is an evolutionary task analysis?
Pietraszewski, D. (in press). The evolved cognitive architecture for groups. APA Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology [PDF] OSF Preprint
How do historical myths work for building groups? What is mysterious about the human interest in producing and consuming history?
Pietraszewski, D., Moncrieff, M. (2024). Homo historicus: History as psychological science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 47, e188 [Link]
If we take seriously the idea that political attitudes are largely confabulations (see Pinsof et al.) and full of self-serving propaganda, what follows?
Pietraszewski, D. (2023). Seven grand challenges for evolutionary political psychology or: Political ideologies as ad-hoc alliances...so what? Psychological Inquiry [PDF] [Target Article] [Response to Commentaries]
Cognitive science cannot flourish if we don't ask what cognition is for.
Smaldino, P. E., Pietraszewski, D., & Wertz, A. E. (2023). On the problems solved by cognitive processes. Cognitive Science, 47, e13297 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13297 [PDF]
Groups are a construction of evolved minds coordinating with one another, and thus any one group identity is not inevitable, and those that exist are the result of complex social negotiations.
McCullough, M. E., & Pietraszewski, D. (2023). On the evolved psychological mechanisms that make peace and reconciliation between groups possible. Behavioral and Brain Sciences [PDF]
The alliance hypothesis of racial categorization has a lot of empirical support, but there is a glaring counter-hypothesis that has never been ruled to explain all of the findings. Here, that counter-hypothesis is directly tested.
Pietraszewski, D. (2022). A (failed) attempt to falsify the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization: Racial categorization is not reduced when crossed with a non-alliance category. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001183 [PDF]
What is the state of past and current theories of what a "group" is? Can we make concrete, testable theories of what a group representation is?
Pietraszewski, D. (2022). Towards a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 45, e97: pp. 1 - 64 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21000583 [PDF]
Debate about the extent to which the mind is modular or massively modular is based on a confusion about at what level of analysis or reduction we are describing the mind. Clarifying this error or confusion resolves the debate.
Pietraszewski, D., & Wertz, A. E. (2021). Why evolutionary psychology should abandon modularity. Perspectives in Psychological Science DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691621997113 [Open Access Link]
A crucial test of the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization, using correct experimental and error-rate calculation techniques, in the context of groups in conflict.
Pietraszewski, D. (2021). The correct way to test the hypothesis that racial categorization a byproduct of an evolved alliance-tracking capacity. Scientific Reports, 11, 3404 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-82975-x [Open Access Link] [PDF]
What are intergroup processes from an evolutionary perspective?
Pietraszewski, D. (2020). Intergroup processes: Principles from an evolutionary perspective. In Social Psychology: Handbook of Basic Principles. 3rd Edition. P. Van Lange, E. T. Higgins, & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds). (pp. 373-391). New York: Guilford. [PDF]
An in-depth task analysis of the psychology of leadership.
Pietraszewski, D. (2020). The evolution of leadership: Leadership and followership as a solution to the problem of creating and executing successful coordination and cooperation enterprises. The Leadership Quarterly, 31, 101299. [PDF] [Supplementary Online Materials]
Kvam, P. D., Hintze, A., Pleskac, T. J., & Pietraszewski, D. (2019). Computational evolution and ecologically rational decision making. In R. Hertwig, T. J. Pleskac, T. Pachur, & The Center for Adaptive Rationality (Eds.) Taming Uncertainty. New York: Oxford University Press.
"Who Said What?" or memory confusion paradigm studies have suffer from a flawed calculation involving correcting for base-rates in errors. This paper explains that error, and re-calculates effect sizes for past studies involving tests of the alliance hypothesis of racial categorization.
Pietraszewski, D. (2018). A reanalysis of crossed-dimension “Who Said What?” paradigm studies, using a better error base-rate correction. Evolution and Human Behavior, 39, 479-489. [PDF] [Supplementary Online Materials]
Evidence of an expected association between organism size and acoustic (vocalization) properties, at some of the earliest ages one can test infants.
Pietraszewski, D., Wertz, A. E., Bryant, G. A., & Wynn, K. (2017). Three-month-old human infants use vocal cues of body size. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 284: 20170656, 1-9. [PDF]
What are the invariant dynamics in multi-agent conflict. How can phenomena like loyalty, asymmetries between offense and defense, an so on emerge from sequences of cost/benefit decisions on the parts of individual actors?
Pietraszewski, D. (2016). How the mind sees coalitional and group conflict: The evolutionary invariances of coalitional conflict dynamics. Evolution and Human Behavior, 37, 470-480. [PDF]
The alliance hypothesis of racial categorization now has considerable support, but what is the mechanism of change in the cognitive system being measured: is racial categorization encoded but inhibited from other inferences and judgments, or is it no longer encoded. Here, a direct experimental test is capable of testing between these two distinct possibilities.
Pietraszewski, D. (2016). Priming race: Does the mind inhibit categorization by race at encoding or recall? Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7, 85-91. [PDF]
Evolutionary psychology in 3000 words.
Pietraszewski, D. (2016). Evolutionary Psychology. In H. Miller (Ed). Sage Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks: Sage. [PDF]
How to political context influence racial categorization? A crucial test of the idea that racial categorization is a byproduct of the mind's evolved alliance-tracking capacity. How does sex, race, and age categorization behave in political contexts?
Pietraszewski, D., Curry, O., Peterson, M. B., Cosmides, L. & , Tooby, J. (2015). Constituents of political cognition: Race, party politics, and the alliance detection system. Cognition, 140, 24-39. [PDF] [Supplementary Online Materials]
The asymmetric war of attrition is an evolutionary biological model of how organisms should trade off value and the costs of conflict in their decisions about remaining in or withdrawing from contested resources. This is a direct experimental test of this model in humans. Do children's expectations of conflict outcomes comport with the predictions of this model? And, are these expectations selective (i.e. do expectations of search outcomes differ from conflict outcomes?)
Pietraszewski, D., & Shaw. A. (2015). Not by strength alone: Children’s conflict expectations follow the logic of the asymmetric war of attrition. Human Nature, 26, 44-72. [PDF]
The first unambiguous and adequate evidence that racial categorization is a byproduct of the mind's alliance-tracking machinery.
Pietraszewski, D., Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2014). The content of our cooperation, not the color of our skin: An alliance detection system regulates categorization by coalition and race, but not sex. PLoS ONE 9(2): e88534. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0088534 [Open Access Link] [PDF] [Supplementary Online Materials]
Is accent, like race, a byproduct of the mind's ability to track alliances?
Pietraszewski, D., & Schwartz, A. (2014). Evidence that accent is a dedicated dimension of social categorization, not a byproduct of coalitional categorization. Evolution and Human Behavior, 35, 51-57. [PDF]
A demonstration of accent categorization producing social categorization, with tightly-matched experimental controls.
Pietraszewski, D., & Schwartz, A. (2014). Evidence that accent is a dimension of social categorization, not a byproduct of perceptual salience, familiarity, or ease-of-processing. Evolution and Human Behavior, 35, 43-50. [PDF] [Supplementary Online Materials]
How do children and adults reason about how conflict-related emotions spread to those not involved in the conflict?
Pietraszewski, D., & German, T. C. (2013). Coalitional psychology on the playground: Reasoning about indirect social consequences in preschoolers and adults. Cognition, 126, 352-363. [PDF]
A short, highly-readable summary of what group psychology is from an evolutionary perspective, for a developmental/comparative audience.
Pietraszewski, D. (2013). What is group psychology? Adaptations for mapping shared intentional stances. In Banaji, M., & Gelman, S., (Eds). Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us (pp. 253-257). New York: Oxford University Press. [PDF]
A early proposal about the elementary building blocks of multi-agent conflict.
Pietraszewski, D. (2012). The elementary dynamics of intergroup conflict and revenge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, 32-33. [PDF]
Methods of data analysis are different than theories of the problems and environmental dynamics that organisms face.
Pietraszewski, D., & Wertz. A. E. (2011). Reverse engineering the structure of cognitive mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 209-210. [PDF]
If humans use reasoning to argue, what then is argument for?
Pietraszewski, D. (2011). What is argument for? An adaptationist approach to argument and debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34, 86-87. [PDF]